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This paper aims to provide a basic explanation of existence, fundamental aspects of reality, 
and consciousness. Existence in its most general sense is identified with the principle of 
logical consistency: to exist means to be logically consistent. The essence of the principle of 
logical consistency is that every thing is what it is and is not what it is not. From this 
principle follows the existence of intrinsic, indescribable identities of things and relations 
between them. There are three fundamental, logically necessary relations: similarity, 
composition and instantiation. Set theory, mathematics, logic and science are presented as 
relational descriptions of reality. Qualities of consciousness (qualia) are identified with 
intrinsic identities of things or at least a certain subset of them, especially in the context of a 
dynamic form of organized complexity. 
 
 
1  Existence 
 
Reality is all that exists, and existence, in the broadest sense, is identical to logical 
consistency: to exist means to be logically consistent, non-contradictory, that is, logically 
possible.1 For every thing it means that it is what it is and is not what it is not. In other words, 
every thing is identical to itself and differentiated from what it is not. We can also choose 
other definitions of existence, for example “to exist means to be part of a temporal-causal 
system,” which may be more useful in practice because it offers the possibility of the 
empirical verification of the existence of a given thing and generally of interacting with it, but 
these definitions of existence will always be narrower than the definition solely on the basis of 
logical consistency and will be to some extent arbitrary or anthropocentric. What all 
definitions of existence have in common is the necessary criterion of logical consistency 
because things that are impossible cannot exist – they are actually not even things because 
they don’t have their identity and are not differentiated from what they are not. Moreover, 
abandonment of the principle of logical consistency would also erase the difference between 
existence and non-existence and the very question of what exists would lose meaning. 
 
We can say that all possible things exist “at least as possibilities.” But why would some things 
exist only “as possibilities” while others also, additionally, “in reality”? What would it even 
mean? It seems that there is no fundamental difference between possibility and reality and 
therefore every possible thing also exists in reality, but of course only in the sense in which it 
is defined (defined ultimately in the most fundamental, logically necessary way – more on 
that in part 2 of this paper). And so, since it would be arbitrary and without a fundamental 
                                               
1 This is the strictly logical version of the metaphysical view known as the “principle of plenitude.” The principle 
of plenitude holds that everything that is possible exists. It was given this name by philosopher Arthur Lovejoy, 
who in his book The Great Chain of Being (1936) traced its historical forms from as far back as Plato. It is also 
present in philosopher David Lewis’s modal realism according to which reality contains all possible 
spatiotemporal worlds and in physicist Max Tegmark’s mathematical universe hypothesis according to which 
reality consists of all possible mathematical structures. Lewis D. (1986): On the Plurality of Worlds; Tegmark 
M. (2007): The Mathematical Universe, https://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0646  
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reason to restrict the definition of existence to selected possibilities, reality in the fundamental 
sense consists of all possibilities. 
 
Identification of existence with logical consistency gives a simple answer to two fundamental 
philosophical questions: why there is something rather than nothing and why there is what 
there is rather than something else. The answer is that all logical possibilities exist – 
necessarily from the definition of existence. To deny the existence of something that is 
logically consistent would mean to deny its logical consistency and thereby to contradict 
oneself and refute one’s assertion. In our world we of course observe only some logical 
possibilities but that means only so much that our world is just a part of reality, one of 
possible worlds. There may be a number of reasons why we live in this particular part of 
reality: chance (we are simply what we are – one of logical possibilities in reality), suitable 
conditions for life of our kind (we would not be able to live in those parts of reality that lack 
such conditions), and various causal factors (that is, various things that stand in the position of 
causes in relation to our existence in a particular place at a particular time). 
 
We need to be careful with the assessment of the logical consistency of theoretical ideas and 
thus of whether they correspond to reality because ideas that at first sight look consistent may 
turn out to be inconsistent on closer inspection. On the other hand, ideas that appear 
inconsistent may actually be consistent. 
 
Example 1: Outside Mary’s house is a lawn with no trees. It seems that it would be logically 
consistent (possible) for a tree to stand on that lawn at this moment, and yet there is none. If 
logical consistency is existence why does no tree exist on that lawn? Didn’t we just find a 
possibility that doesn’t exist? The answer is that if it is indeed consistent for a tree to stand on 
that lawn then a tree does stand there – but in a different possible world, which is an exact 
copy of our world except for the tree. Strictly speaking, the tree does not stand on the lawn 
outside Mary’s house but on a copy of that lawn in a different world. However, one might 
object that it seems consistent for the tree to stand on the lawn, at this moment, in our world, 
not in a different one. But such an idea would not in fact be consistent, because inserting a 
tree in a world changes the definition (constitution) of the world at that moment, thereby 
making it a different world. 
 
Example 2: In mathematics we can find statements that (1) sum of interior angles of a triangle 
is always 180° but also that (2) sum of interior angles of a triangle is different from 180°. If 
these statements are understood in an appropriately limited sense, that is that the first 
statement applies only to triangles in a flat (Euclidean) space and the second applies to 
triangles in a curved (non-Euclidean) space, then the statements will be logically consistent 
(mutually and each in itself). But if they are understood in an absolute sense (that each 
statement applies to all possible spaces) or in an inappropriately limited sense (for example 
that the second statement applies to triangles in a flat space) there will be a contradiction. The 
flat and curved spaces are different possible worlds and different possible worlds are actually 
different things, with different identities – their simultaneous existence is not a contradiction 
as long as there is no inconsistent mixing of their identities. Propositions (meanings of 
statements), including axioms (such as Euclid’s axioms, which define the flat space, or 
Euclid’s axioms with Euclid’s parallel postulate replaced by its negation, which define the 
curved space), are properties of a certain thing and may not apply to other things. Only if a 
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proposition is a tautology (necessary truth) does it apply to every thing, and if a proposition is 
contradictory it applies to no thing (and is itself nothing).2 
 
Example 3: It seems possible that there would be nothing (no consistent thing), but if this 
possibility existed, it would mean that there would indeed be nothing, which is obviously not 
true. However, “there is nothing” is a proposition/axiom, a property of a certain thing, and a 
property as well as the thing that has it are something, making the proposition inconsistent 
and therefore impossible. The proposition would be consistent if its meaning was limited to 
the content of some world, thus defining an empty world, a world in which there is nothing. 
And if “there is nothing” is not a tautology there is also a world to which it does not apply 
(the logically necessary way of defining things described in part 2 of this paper generates also 
non-empty worlds). 
 
In any case, it is necessary to define ideas with sufficient precision so that it is clear to what 
and in what sense they attribute existence and so that we can assess their consistency. In order 
to make these ideas maximally clear we would have to define them in the most fundamental, 
logically necessary way. However, it is evident that the ability of pure reason to define 
ideas/theories and assess their consistency, and thus to find out what exists, is limited. 
Moreover, according to Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, a consistent theoretical system 
that is sufficiently complex to include arithmetic and thus infinite numbers would need 
uncountably many axioms to prove (deduce) all its truths. And according to Gödel’s second 
incompleteness theorem it is impossible to prove that a theoretical system that is sufficiently 
complex to include arithmetic is really consistent. (Both incompleteness theorems also apply 
to contemporary physical theories.) Due to these limitations of pure reason, to know reality 
we also need senses, that is, causal interaction with our environment, because if we interact 
with something then it must exist, and this interaction also reveals to us in which part of the 
reality of possibilities we live. Of course, senses have their limitations too (limitation to 
certain aspects of reality, limited reach/range, speed of light – maximum possible speed of 
signals, susceptibility to sensory illusions...). 
 
2  Fundamental aspects of reality 
 
As has been noted, the principle of logical consistency essentially means that every thing is 
what it is and is not what it is not. And so every thing is defined/constituted both positively, 
that is, by what it is, and negatively, that is, by what it is not. The positive definition (nature) 
of a thing is indescribable, in the sense that it can only be “described” self-referentially, by 
referring to the thing itself: the thing is what it is. At most we can give the thing a label/name. 
On the other hand, the negative definition (nature) of a thing can be described by presenting 
the thing in relations to other things; it sets the thing apart from and connects it with other 
things. And so every thing has both an intrinsic (self-referential/qualitative) identity and an 
extrinsic (relational/structural) identity. Reality is a system of things and relations between 
them, where things are indescribable/ineffable identities and relations are connections 
between them. These two fundamental aspects of reality, or identities of every thing – 
intrinsic and extrinsic – are inseparably connected like two sides of a coin. 
 
                                               
2 A “possible world” doesn’t have to be a thing that has no spatial, temporal or causal relations with other 
possible worlds; in general it can be any thing that provides a context for the truth of a proposition. For example, 
the proposition “Spanish is the official language” is true in countries like Spain or Mexico but not true in 
countries like Germany or France. These countries (or their internal regions, cities etc.) are possible worlds for 
this proposition. 
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The most fundamental relations seem to be the following: 
- similarity, 
- composition (relation between part and whole), and 
- instantiation (relation between an abstract thing and its instances). 
 
It seems that these three fundamental relations apply to every thing and are necessary for the 
definition of all other relations and for logical reasoning. The negative definition of every 
thing is reducible to these three relations. While the relation of similarity can be hierarchical 
or non-hierarchical, relations of composition and instantiation are based on a hierarchy in the 
sense of “one over many”: a whole “contains” or “encompasses” parts and an abstract thing 
(also called a universal) is “instantiated” or “exemplified” in instances/examples. The 
composition and instantiation relations are special kinds of the similarity relation. Similarity 
of things is the closeness of their definitions; it is connected with the fact that they instantiate 
the same abstract thing and are parts of the same whole and simultaneously they also 
instantiate different abstract things and are parts of different wholes. An abstract/general thing 
is a property that is had by its instances, for example concrete red things have the property of 
red color/redness, or concrete circles have the property of circle. An abstract thing has 
instances and it can itself be an instance of an even more abstract thing (for example circle is 
an abstract thing that is an instantiation of geometric object). A concrete thing has no 
instances. Abstracta and concreta constitute another two fundamental aspects of reality that 
are inseparably connected like two sides of a coin.3 
 
The maximum similarity is between things that are exact copies of each other. They differ 
only by thisness (particularity), which is a property of each copy connected with the copy’s 
position in space or time. At a minimum, all things are similar in that they are things, that is, 
that they have qualities (intrinsic identities) and stand in relations to other things. Thing and 
relation are instantiations of the most general property – the property of existence (logical 
consistency). 
 
Unlike things, fundamental relations have no intrinsic identity; they are a consequence of the 
existence of things (and things are a consequence of the existence of fundamental relations). 
According to a radical version of the metaphysical view called ontic structural realism there 
are only relations in reality;4 but if there is a relation of similarity then there must also be 
something that is similar. Or if there is a relation between a part and a whole then there must 
also be something that is a part and something that is a whole. And if there is a relation 
between abstract and concrete then there must also be something that is abstract and 
something that is concrete. This something is not a relation but a thing. This does not rule out 
the existence of relations between relations or relations between relations and things, but 
relations must ultimately be grounded in things, otherwise relations would lose their meaning. 
 
A thing can be described by its relations to other things – to which things it is (in a certain 
way and to a certain extent) similar; which things it is a part of; which things are its parts; 
which things it instantiates; from which things it is abstracted. But all these descriptions refer 
to other things than the thing we describe. They actually describe what this thing is not – they 
are negative descriptions of the thing. Although the description of a thing by its parts defines 
what the thing is in the compositional sense, that is, parts taken together as a whole/collection 
                                               
3 Philosopher James Franklin defines pure/mathematical structure in a similar way, with “concepts of same and 
different, part and whole.” Franklin J. (2008): Aristotelian Realism, 
http://www.maths.unsw.edu.au/%7Ejim/irv.pdf, p. 113. 
4 See e.g.: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/structural-realism/ 
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(this is the compositional identity of the thing, which is a kind of structural/relational 
identity), since this thing is not identical to any of its parts this, too, is a description of 
the thing by what the thing is not. Alternatively we can describe this thing in the 
compositional sense by the abstract things it instantiates, since these instantiations are parts or 
overlapping collections of parts of the thing. Similar to how a whole has parts (interior things) 
that constitute its structural identity in the compositional sense, an abstract thing has 
instantiations (exterior things) that constitute its structural identity in the instantiating sense 
(the thing is abstracted from its instances as their common property). These are all negative 
descriptions of a thing. A positive description – a description that gives what the thing is – 
cannot be based on relations and therefore does not exist. Or, if someone wills, it can only be 
based on the “relation” of self-reference/intrinsic identity. Intrinsic identity is an 
unstructured/indivisible quality. 
 
As for relations, since these have no intrinsic identity they are only defined negatively, for 
example by the things (or relations) between which they hold. Thereby is determined the 
extrinsic identity of relations. 
 
To sum up, the constituents of reality can be classified into these four combinations:5 
 
  Abstract (has instances) Concrete (has no instances) 
Thing (has intrinsic identity) 1 2 
Relation (has no intrinsic identity) 3 4 
  
Properties (abstracta) that are instantiated by things are themselves things (abstract things), 
while properties that are instantiated by relations are relations (abstract relations). Some 
properties, however, can be instantiated by both things and relations (existence, abstractness, 
concreteness); for these properties it is not defined whether they are things or relations, that is, 
whether they have an intrinsic identity. 
 
It seems that pure set theory captures all logically possible structures of fundamental relations 
between concrete things (that is, collections of other concrete things), between concrete things 
and abstract things (properties), and indirectly also between abstract things themselves, 
through their instantiations in the form of sets. A set is a collection of objects called members, 
and a pure set is a set whose all members are themselves sets, all members of its members are 
sets, and so on, down to an empty set or without end; the complete compositional structure of 
every concrete thing is a pure set.6 The relation between a whole and a part is here the relation 
between a set and its member (or the derived relation between a set and its subset); the 
relation of similarity can be seen in that the members of the set have something mutually 
different (and also different from the whole), which are properties that make them distinct 
parts, and they also have something in common, for example the property based on which 
they belong to this set (predicate); and the instantiation relation is the relation between a 
property and a member that has the property. A common property is reflected in the fact that 
                                               
5 Let us give an example according to this table: 1 – apple (in general sense), 2 – ten concrete apples, 3 – number 
ten, 4 – instantiation of number ten as a relation between ten concrete apples. 
6 By pure set theory I mean the collection of all consistent axiomatizations of naive pure set theory with the 
possibility of “multisets,” which are sets that contain repeated copies of their members. Here sets are concrete 
things because copies are concrete instances of the same abstract set. Naive set theory defines a set by listing all 
its members or by defining a property that all its members and only its members have. The latter way of 
definition needs to be replaced by more specific axioms to avoid contradictions. A consistent axiomatization of 
naive set theory that is sufficiently complex to include arithmetic (such as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) would 
need uncountably many axioms to prove all its truths, as per Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. 
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structures of the individual members (their structural identities) are similar in a certain way 
and to a certain extent (they have the same structural feature/property) and thus qualities 
(intrinsic identities) of the members or qualities of parts of the members are similar too (they 
have the same qualitative feature/property). Also note that sets cannot be reduced to their 
members: for example, a set whose members are sets x, y, z is a different set than a set whose 
members are all members of x, y, z. 
 
Mathematics and logic are inseparably intertwined with set theory. Every abstract 
mathematical object/structure with its mathematical properties (numbers, spaces, geometric 
objects, combinations, permutations, groups, functions…) can be interpreted as a pure set, that 
is, it can be instantiated as a pure set or as a relation between pure sets. Although these 
instantiations involve things, namely sets, every set is defined here purely relationally, by its 
members; its intrinsic nature is irrelevant for mathematical purposes. The same mathematical 
object/structure can be instantiated by different sets or inter-set relations whose structures are 
similar in a relevant way; it is a structural feature (property) they have in common.7 Pure set 
theory is regarded as a foundation of mathematics. (Category theory, which is another 
foundational system for mathematics, captures the similarity relation between mathematical 
structures as morphism, a mapping/transformation from one structure to another.) 
 
Logical relations can be interpreted as relations between sets too. Predicate (property) 
corresponds to the set of all objects that satisfy this predicate (have this property) while 
subject is a member of this set. Logical deduction is based on the transition from general to 
particular, hence from sets to their members or subsets, while logical induction vice versa.8 
Logical connective “and” between properties corresponds to set intersection, while logical 
connective “or” between properties corresponds to set union, and the negation of a property 
corresponds to set complement.9 (Other logical connectives can be defined as combinations of 
“and”, “or” and negation.) Proposition is a property with a subject-predicate structure that is 
instantiated in those possible worlds in which the proposition is true, and application of 
logical connectives “and”, “or” and negation to propositions corresponds to intersection, 
union and complement of sets of possible worlds.10 
 
Science is based on mathematics and logic because it focuses on mathematical/logical 
relations. Of particular importance in science are causal relations, which are a special case of 
mathematical/logical relations in the context of the arrow/flow of time, where consequences 
logically follow from causes (if we use a broad definition of “causes” as initial conditions plus 
time-invariant structures which we call laws of physics and which manifest in 
force/acceleration interactions between things in spacetime). Unpredictability/randomness in 
quantum physics represents an interruption or weakening of causality because some events 
(measurement outcomes) cannot be derived (deduced) from preceding events and only the 
probabilities of possible outcomes can be derived. Time can be understood from the structural 
                                               
7 Franklin J. (2008): Aristotelian Realism, http://www.maths.unsw.edu.au/%7Ejim/irv.pdf, p. 110. 
8 It may appear at first sight that this principle does not apply in such cases where we can deduce a property of 
a whole from the properties of its parts (e.g. calculate the mass of a whole by adding up the masses of its parts) 
but such a deduction also assumes general rules that apply to all parts and thus correspond to a set that 
encompasses the whole. 
9 For example, the connective “and” between properties “red” and “apple” corresponds to the intersection of the 
set of all red things and the set of all apples. The compound property “red and apple” is instantiated in all the 
things that are in this intersection. 
10 For example, the compound proposition “Peter watches TV and Paul sleeps” corresponds to the intersection of 
the set of all possible worlds in which Peter watches TV and the set of all possible worlds in which Paul sleeps. 
The proposition is true in all the worlds in this intersection. 
 7
viewpoint as a certain connected order (sequence) of mathematical structures that are 
embedded in a space (space itself is a mathematical structure) and this order makes up a more 
complex mathematical structure with the additional dimension of time – spacetime. The 
direction of this order (“the arrow of time” from the past to the future) is identical to the 
entropic gradient of mathematical structures in the order, in accordance with the second law 
of thermodynamics according to which entropy (disorder and probability of a state) of a 
causally isolated system tends to increase with time. In other words, asymmetry between the 
past and the future is the consequence of the fact that later states of a system (mathematical 
structures in the order) have a higher entropy than earlier ones.11 
 
Although reality consists of timeless, eternally existing possibilities (uncreatable and 
indestructible – logically necessary), among these possibilities are arrangements in certain 
orders that we experience as time. 
 
3  Consciousness 
 
Science, mathematics and logic give us a rich and useful picture of reality but it seems that 
something important is missing in this picture – our consciousness. In the 1990s philosopher 
David Chalmers coined the term “hard problem of consciousness,” which expresses the 
absence of qualities that characterize our consciousness (e.g. the experience of red color, 
sweet taste, pain etc.) or the difficulties with explaining these qualities in the mathematical-
scientific description of reality – in contrast to “easy problems of consciousness,” which 
science tackles relatively successfully and which include the explanation of reactions to 
stimuli, integration of information, behavior control, functional differences between sleep and 
waking, verbal reporting of experiences, and so on.12 According to neuroscience, qualities of 
consciousness (qualia) are related to spatiotemporal configurations of electrical and chemical 
signals in the brain (neural correlates of consciousness). If we arrange neurons in a certain 
way and let them exchange electrical and chemical signals in a certain spatiotemporal 
configuration, suddenly there appears – as if by waving a magic wand – for example the 
experience of red color. The mystery is not only why red color, of all things, appears but why 
anything appears at all. It seems that nothing at all would have to appear and neurons would 
just keep exchanging their signals.13 
 
However, the hard problem of consciousness could be a consequence of the fact that science, 
mathematics and logic focus on the description of things, which is necessarily relational, and 
thus they leave aside the intrinsic identities of things, which are relationally indescribable and 
thus cannot be derived either. There seems to be a natural explanation for the hard problem: 
qualities of consciousness are exactly intrinsic identities of things, or at least a special kind of 
intrinsic identities of things.14 The experience of red color is apparently connected with neural 
configurations but cannot be satisfactorily described by them. We can describe red color by 
reference to neural configurations, electromagnetic radiation of a certain wavelength, 
                                               
11 This applies at least in our world, where all physical laws except the second law of thermodynamics (and some 
very rare radioactive processes) hold in both time directions, hence they describe perfectly reversible processes 
and thus do not differentiate between the past and the future. 
12 Chalmers D. (1995): Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, http://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf, p. 1-4. 
13 In science we know properties that do not exist on the level of atoms/molecules but appear on the macro-level, 
e.g. viscosity of a fluid or temperature. However, these macro-properties can be derived (calculated) from micro-
properties, in contrast to qualities of consciousness, whose derivation from the neural micro-structure appears 
impossible. 
14 This metaphysical view is known as Russellian monism; see e.g.: http://philpapers.org/browse/russellian-
monism 
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tomatoes and various other things that are not red color, but it will still not be satisfactory 
(thanks to these descriptions a person who never saw red would be able to learn about 
relations of red color to various things but would probably still not know what red looks like). 
It is because the complete definition of red color is not only negative but also positive, but 
that is self-referential, ineffable. Red is red – nothing else can be said about what red is. 
 
The spatiotemporal structure of firing neurons forms a whole and this whole has its ineffable 
identity, which might be for example red color (as a concrete quality), or more accurately the 
experience of red color. It seems that we can only know this ineffable identity by being it – by 
being the spatiotemporal configuration of firing neurons whose ineffable aspect is red color – 
or by creating in our minds a sufficiently precise representation of it (looking at a bared brain 
is not enough because sight only gives us part of the information about the neural structure). 
When we perceive a quality of some external thing, for example the red color of a tomato, the 
relevant part of the structure of the tomato is mapped via causal relations onto its neural 
representation in our brain and we are then conscious of the ineffable identity of this neural 
representation as of red color. The structure of the neural representation, that is, its identity in 
the compositional sense, should be (significantly) similar in some way to the structure of the 
tomato and so we can also assume a certain similarity between the ineffable identity of the 
tomato and the ineffable identity of the representation. But the structure of the representation 
will also be (significantly) different, not least because it is constituted by neural relations but 
also because the representation has significant neural relations to other things in our brain 
which too influence and shape it. So the ineffable identity of the neural representation is 
different from the ineffable identity of the tomato and we perceive the representation in the 
context of other things in the brain, which together create our overall conscious experience. 
Therein lies the difference between “having red color” and “being conscious of red color.” If 
we tried to experience red color as the original (unprocessed) quality of the tomato, this 
experience would probably be indistinguishable for us from the experience of 
unconsciousness because the red color of a tomato in itself has no or just negligible 
consciousness. 
 
Intrinsic identities of things, or a certain subset of them, are a natural candidate for qualities of 
consciousness because: 
(1) qualities of consciousness and intrinsic identities of things are indescribable, 
(2) qualities of consciousness and intrinsic identities of things are connected with relational 
descriptions (in the case of qualities of consciousness, with neural correlates of 
consciousness). 
 
We can also note further similarities between qualities of consciousness and intrinsic 
identities of things: 
(3) qualities of consciousness and intrinsic identities of things are graded, 
(4) qualities of consciousness and intrinsic identities of things can be blended. 
 
By “graded” in point (3) I mean the following. The structure, that is, the structural identity of 
a thing is inseparably connected with the intrinsic identity of the thing, because both kinds of 
identity define the same thing. Now, if we changed the structure a little, the intrinsic identity 
of the thing would change a little too – it would be almost the same thing. In the case of 
consciousness, for example a small change in the wavelength of electromagnetic radiation, 
and the correspondingly small change in the neural structure, is connected with the change of 
color into a similar shade. 
 
 9
Regarding point (4): when blending two things, there is a change in their structures into a new 
but (significantly) similar structure because of mutual causal relations, and the intrinsic 
identity of this new structure will therefore be similar to the intrinsic identities of both things 
before blending. In consciousness we perceive blending of qualities in a similar way. For 
example, if we blend a drop of red color with a drop of white color we will perceive the 
resultant product as having a different but similar quality – pink color. 
 
If we identify all intrinsic identities with consciousness then the whole reality is conscious (a 
view known as panpsychism). But we should at least distinguish the level of consciousness, 
which is connected with the “intensity” of qualities. The consciousness of a stone is probably 
so weak that from a practical (and moral) view it doesn’t even make sense to talk of 
consciousness. Similarly, there is negligible consciousness on the level of a group of people, 
although the consciousness of the individual persons in this group is obviously intense. What 
does the intensity of a quality depend on? On the basis of study of neural correlates of our 
consciousness it appears that the level of consciousness and thus the intensity of the quality of 
a thing is connected with the complexity of its structure. There are various measures of 
complexity and two basic approaches to their formulation are “disorganized” complexity and 
“organized” complexity. Disorganized complexity is high in those systems that have many 
different and independent (random) elements, while organized complexity is high in those 
systems that have many different but also variously dependent (integrated) elements. For 
consciousness the organized complexity in a dynamic form appears to be important, that is, 
the joint result of the processes of integration and differentiation (attractive and repulsive 
forces); it seems that integration strengthens (intensifies) the quality of the whole by more 
tightly connecting its parts but at the same time weakens it by homogenization of differences 
which give it novel contributions, while differentiation works in the opposite way, by 
strengthening the quality of the whole with different contributions but weakening it by 
fragmentation of the whole. Therefore there are qualities of different intensity on different 
levels of structure. Our consciousness is in general somewhere between fragmentation into 
parts and merger into one thing and can flexibly change the intensity of its parts by focusing 
on some of its contents or relaxing into a less differentiated state. 
 
The ability to differentiate and integrate also appears to be important from the evolutionary 
viewpoint because it helps the organism to survive and reproduce in a complex and changing 
environment: in order for the organism to find food, a mate, and avoid or remove threats it 
needs to identify things on different levels of the composition of reality, that is, intensify 
certain parts or wholes in its representation of reality by concentrating in them sophisticated 
causal power (processes of differentiation and integration) so that they can effectively 
influence its behavior. 
 
As an example of the measure of organized complexity proposed for the determination of the 
level of consciousness we can mention “integrated information” of neuroscientist Giulio 
Tononi.15 The basic principles of this theory of consciousness are that the conscious 
experience is differentiated and simultaneously unified into a whole (overall experience), to 
which correspond differentiation and integration of the underlying structure of the conscious 
system (brain), and a fundamental role is played by the information structure of the system, 
which is the repertoire of possible states of the system, and by causal relations in the system. 
Integrated information Φ, which is a quantitative indicator of consciousness, is then the 
amount of information of the whole that exceeds the sum of information of its parts when they 
                                               
15 Tononi G. (2008): Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto, 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.2307/25470707  
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are considered independently. It is maximized on that scale of space and time where parts are 
tightly integrated and simultaneously richly differentiated. Integrated information theory 
denies that all things have consciousness as it attributes zero consciousness to systems with 
zero integrated information. Among such systems can also be complicated computational 
systems that are capable of imitating our behavior but (in contrast to naturally evolved 
organisms) do not contain internal feedback circuits.16 The concept of integrated information 
continues to evolve in an effort to better capture the connection between information structure 







The human mind as a product of the processes of differentiation and integration, symbolized by the analytically 
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